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THE ONE-CHILD POLICY AND PRIVATIZATION OF 
EDUCATION IN CHINA
Guangyu Tan
State University of New York-Fredonia
ABSTRACT
China’s one-child policy is one of the most signifi cant, yet controversial, pro-
grams of planned fertility. While the focus of the controversy is on the nature of 
the policy (for example, whether the policy is humane, or whether it violates the 
basic human rights of individual freedom), the impact of such population control 
program on China’s educational policy and practices is understudied. Moreover, 
the relationship between the one-child policy and the privatization of K-12 edu-
cation in China remains insuffi ciently understood. Therefore, the purpose of this 
article is to address this gap in the literature and to explore the impact of one-child 
policy on privatization of education, and the transformation of education policy 
in China since 1979. 
INTRODUCTION
Implemented in 1979, China’s one-child policy is one of the most signifi cant, 
yet controversial, programs of planned fertility. It emerged as a panacea for the 
country’s many pressing social problems, including population crisis, poverty, 
infl ation, agricultural stagnation, inadequate school facilities and unemployment 
(Chow & Chen, 1989). The one-child policy was designed to restrict population 
growth, thereby advancing economic prosperity in China. Since the inception of 
the one-child policy in 1979, China’s population has decreased by about 250 mil-
lion (Kane & Choi, 1999). This reduction in fertility has eased some of the pres-
sures on communities, the state, and the environment in a country that still carries 
one fi fth of the world’s population. Moreover, because of the low fertility rate, 
China can focus on developing its economy and raising the living standards of its 
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people. Since 1979, an unprecedented 150 million people have been lifted out of 
poverty (Potts, 2006). As Greenhalgh (2003a) suggests, the one-child policy has 
served as a means for China to accelerate its industrialization and modernization, 
catch up with the West, and achieve its rightful place in a global stage. 
Despite these positive effects, China’s one-child population policy has been 
highly controversial and it has been criticized by the Western world as “totalitar-
ian,” “coercive,” “barbaric,” and “uncivilized” ( Ebenstein, 2010; Greenhalgh, 
2003a; Li, 1989; and Wasserstrom, 1984). While the focus of the debate is on 
the nature of the one-child policy (for example, whether the policy is humane, or 
whether the policy violates the basic human rights of individual freedom), the im-
pact of such population control program on China’s educational policy and prac-
tices is understudied. Furthermore, the relationship between the one-child policy 
and the privatization of K-12 education in China remains insuffi ciently reported. 
Therefore, the purpose of this article is to address this gap in the literature on the 
impact of one-child policy on privatization of education and the transformation of 
education policy in China since 1979. 
This article is a review of literature and legislation on family planning in 
China from 1979 to the present. It aims at answering the following research ques-
tions:  1) What is the relationship between the one-child mandate and the emer-
gence of private education in China? 2) How does one-child policy affect family 
choice of schools?
 This article begins with an historical overview of China’s one-child policy, 
elucidating the historical, social and political context of its implementation.  The 
article further focuses on the relationship between the one-child policy and pa-
rental school choices in China. It closely examines two forms of private schools: 
the elite private schools (Gui zu xue xiao) and the people-run schools (Min ban 
xue xiao).  
Previous research has considered these private schools primarily as an eco-
nomic response to the liberalized climate of the 1980s when the once intrusive 
state acceded a role, even in the provision of education, to entrepreneurs (Kwong, 
1997). However, this article argues that the one-child policy has contributed to and 
facilitated the emergence of private schools. Because each couple could only have 
one child, the parents were not satisfi ed with the mediocre educational services 
that public schools offered to their single children. Many parents were anxious to 
improve the chances for their single children to learn marketable and employable 
skills or to gain entrance to Ivy League education. Boasting high educational stan-
dards, strict discipline, highly qualifi ed instructors, and state-of-art technology, 
elite private schools (Gui zu xue xiao) have been established to cater to the needs 
and demands of a wealthy clientele (Kwong, 1997; Lin, 1994). Indeed, China’s 
growing middle class and nouveau riche regard these elite private schools for their 
single children as the latest status symbol (Arora, 2010). 
It would be incorrect, however, to assume that all private schools are elite, ca-
tering to the rich and the powerful. The people-run schools (Min ban xue xiao) are 
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often short in funding, lack qualifi ed teachers, and lack high standards in school 
administration (Lin, 1994). Nevertheless, these private schools have been set up 
to serve the unplanned children or those who were born outside of the family 
planning policy. As a result of the one-child mandate, unplanned children or ille-
gitimate children are denied basic benefi ts and rights, including the right to a free 
9-year public education (Greenhalgh, 2003b). Therefore, the people-run schools 
are a response to the increasing demand for a basic education for unplanned 
children. The discrepancy between the elite private schools and the people-run 
schools symbolizes the increasing gap between the rich and poor in China, the 
second largest economic power of the world.
THE ONE-CHILD POLICY: HISTORICAL AND 
POLITICAL BACKGROUND
For thousands of years, the traditional ideal Chinese family was patriarchal 
in authority, patrilineal in descent, and patrilocal in residence (Huang, 1982). The 
feudal ideology, which values fecundity and favors male offspring to maintain 
paternal lineages, has dominated Chinese culture and family life. It was com-
monly believed that the more sons one had, the more good fortune a family would 
have. Birth control or family planning has confl icted with such cultural values and 
with the patriarchal system, and therefore was alien to Chinese society before the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC) was established in 1949.  
During the fi rst decade of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) rule between 
1949 and 1959, the Chinese leaders introduced the novel concept of state-con-
trolled family planning as “an irrefutable task of the socialist state” (Greenhalgh, 
2003b, p. 201). Any unregulated or unplanned human reproduction was consid-
ered antisocialist and contrary to the fundamental interests of the Chinese state 
(Greenhalgh). In keeping with this idea, births were planned by the state on the 
basis of the collective good, and state planned birth control has been placed at the 
center of China’s approach to population control to this day. Yet, no specifi c poli-
cies or measures were adopted to slow the birth rate.  
This birth-control campaign was suspended during the 1960s and 1970s be-
cause a large population was once again considered to be an asset to economic 
growth. The Chinese government shifted its focus from overpopulation to the 
shortage of manpower (Freeberne, 1965). Unrestrained population growth, a fall-
ing morality rate, and concurrent improvements in health care resulted in a de-
mographic explosion in China that taxed the country beyond its economic and 
political resources. China’s population grew from 500 million in 1947 to 800 
million by 1970, and was close to one billion in 1980—approximately 22.7% of 
the world’s population (Rosenberg & Jing, 1996). If the trend had continued, the 
three-child family would have produced a projected population of 1.414 billion by 
the year 2000; of 2.923 billion by 2050; and of 4.260 billion by 2080 (Goodstadt, 
1982, p. 39). 
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In response to this population crisis, the Chinese government launched a 
birth-control campaign from 1971-1979, advising its citizens to marry late, not to 
have their fi rst child until the age of 25, to have children spaced at longer inter-
vals, and to have fewer offspring (Chow & Chen, 1989). This campaign laid the 
groundwork for the one-child per married couple policy instituted in 1979. The 
one-child policy was also a result of the government’s effort to improve popula-
tion quality and individual living standards. After decades of political turmoil 
(especially ten years of destruction of “Cultural Revolution 1” from 1966-1976), 
China’s economy was stagnant, and people were living with bare necessity. De-
termined to overcome the sluggish economic growth and low living standards, 
the new regime under Deng Xiao Ping’s leadership, launched an economic reform 
in 1979, placing the development of “market socialism” and the transformation 
of China into a modern nation within decades as the top priority (Greenhalgh, 
2003a). As economic goals were expressed as per capita gains, population control 
was the key to this new reform agenda. Muhua Chen, vice premier and head of the 
State Council Birth Planning Leading Group, stated,
Under present conditions in China, whether or not to control population 
growth is defi nitely not merely a question of having fewer or more children, 
but a serious question related to the development of our social productive 
force, to the realization of the four modernizations, to socialist construction, 
and to the strategic transition to communism (Chen, 1979,p. 2; as cited in 
Greenhalgh, 2003b, p. 203). 
 
Between the mid1970s and early 1980s, discursive elements from various 
sources were drawn and elaborated into a complex conceptual framework that 
served to legitimize and, later, in 1980s and 1990s, guided the enforcement of 
the one-child policy. This discourse established the basic goals, rationale, and 
measures of birth planning and control. The one-child policy generally allows one 
child per couple under normal circumstances 2 (Yang, 2007). However, depending 
on the provincial economic development, population size, location, and to some 
extent, fertility desires, the one-child policy has varied at the provincial and local 
levels. To battle the patriarchal belief of “the more sons, the better,” the Chinese 
government offered four major rationales for planned fertility and few children: 
better health care for both children and mothers; better social conditions for rais-
ing future generations; increasing work effi ciency and political awareness; and 
promoting gender equity (Huang, 1982). 
With the introduction of the one-child policy, the Chinese government has 
undertaken tremendous efforts and a number of measures, including education, 
persuasion, and media promotion coupled with economic rewards or sanctions 
(Huang, 1982; Chow & Chen, 1989; Rosenberg & Jing, 1996; Greenhalgh, 2003). 
Government policy has emphasized education about modern methods of contra-
ception, eugenics, maternal care and child-care. Furthermore, the government has 
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dispensed free birth-control pills and devices and has legalized abortion. Couples 
who comply with the mandate receive an honorary certifi cate along with mon-
etary awards and privileges such as extended maternity leave, free nursery care, 
free medical care, and special access to education and job opportunities (Chow 
& Chen; and Rosenberg & Jing). Parents who violate the one-child policy are 
severely penalized or disciplined with economic sanctions commonly known as 
“social compensation fee [SCF]3 ,” and they forfeit other social benefi ts (Huang; 
and Chow & Chen). 
As a result of the one-child policy, the total birth rate decreased from 2.9 in 
1979 to 1.7 in 2004, with a rate of 1.3 in urban areas and just under 2.0 in rural 
areas (Hesketh, Li, & Zhu, 2005). The policy is estimated to have reduced the 
number of births by over 400 million since 1979 (NPDSRG, 2007; Zhang, 2007); 
however, the impact of the one-child policy is beyond population control. It has 
far-reaching effects on Chinese social structure, women’s roles in production and 
reproduction, children’s development and well-being, and education policies and 
practices in China. It is beyond the scope of this article to discuss all of the im-
pacts of the one-child policy, and, therefore, this article focuses on the role that the 
policy plays in the emergence of private schooling in China. 
THE ONE-CHILD POLICY AND 
PRIVATIZATION OF EDUCATION
Since the launch of the economic reforms in 1979, Chinese education, like 
other institutions and enterprises, has experienced the processes of privatization, 
commercialization and marketization. In the context of capitalism with Chinese 
characteristics, the centralized educational system has been rendered inappro-
priately (Yang, 2004). Acknowledging that the over-centralization and stringent 
rules would hinder the initiatives and enthusiasm of local and non-government 
educational institutions, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) called in 1985 for 
steps to streamline administration and devolve powers to local government—
steps that would allow them more fl exibility to manage education. Since then, 
the state has begun to diversify educational services, allowing and encouraging 
the non-government sectors to establish and administer educational institutions. 
The central government has changed its monopolistic role to macro-management, 
providing the necessary framework for educational development (Hawkins, 2000; 
Ngok and Chan, 2003). The retreat of the central government has provided space 
for local government as well as non-government sectors to assume more respon-
sibilities for education provision, fi nancing and regulation. Thus, non-government 
organizations now provide education services in the formal public education sec-
tor, thereby leading to the emergence of private schools. Compared with public 
schools, the private education sector remains small; however, privatization of 
education has become an inevitable trend in China. According to China’s Min-
istry of Education [MOE] (2008), there were 95,200 private schools of various 
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levels, and 22,300 private vocational training institutions, enrolling as many as 34 
million students in 2007. The total number of students in China’s private schools 
in 2007 was equivalent to more than half of France’s population and nearly four 
times the population of Switzerland (Bing, 2009).   
In addition to the top-down educational reform, this article argues that the 
one-child policy plays an important role in the emergence of private education in 
China. First, the government has made strenuous efforts to limit parents’ child-
bearing in exchange for the greater opportunities it provides for the “only child,” 
including educational opportunities. The offi cial slogan for the one-child cam-
paign is You Sheng You Yu (give birth to fewer children, but give them better 
care and education), aimed at improving children’s well-being (Yang, 2007, p. 
417). The underlying rationale is that more resources at the national, community, 
and household levels will be available for children and that children with fewer 
siblings will garner more resources and fare better in physical and intellectual 
development (Peng, 1997). The long-lasting You Sheng You Yu campaign has 
greatly infl uenced parents’ expectations for the only child and has provided them 
incentives to better educate their children. Furthermore, in an era of a competitive 
labor market, parents—especially the middle and upper class parents in urban 
China—are not satisfi ed with the mediocre education provided by public schools, 
and they are preoccupied with giving their only child the best education despite 
the overwhelming fi nancial burdens (Mok, Wang, & Zhang, 2009). Parents’ ob-
session with children’s education facilitated the emergence of private schools, 
private tutoring services, and private extra-curricular classes, which have become 
an important component of the marketization of China’s education. For example, 
in order to prepare their children for the competitive globalized world, Chinese 
parents consider learning English to be very important to the future of their chil-
dren. A growing number of parents have sent their children to private tutoring 
classes or to private English schools in order to learn English (Mok, et al). Many 
bilingual private schools have been established to cater to the demand of middle 
and upper middle class parents. These elite or so called Gui Zu (noble) schools 
boast high educational standards, strict discipline, excellent learning conditions 
and environment, high technology, and high quality faculty, including some na-
tive English speakers (Lin, 1994). These schools charge stunningly high tuitions 
and fees—some equivalent to 35 or more years of income of an ordinary peasant 
in rural China (Mok, et al.,). These private schools or “checkbook” schools are a 
luxury reserved for nouveau riche. 
In addition to academic performance, Chinese parents increasingly expect 
their children to master a variety of skills. Equipping their children with artistic or 
athletic skills has been popular among urban middle class parents. Such skills can 
be counted as part of the national entrance examination scores for college, thereby 
giving them a better chance of getting into prestigious universities. These skills 
are considered as necessary stepping-stones in getting established in a success-
ful career. According to a survey conducted by a market research company, 52% 
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of children under the age of 12 in China attend private extra-curricular classes 
on weekends, and 62% of children aged 10-12 take additional private lessons in 
English, math, music, art, dance and martial arts (Mok, et. al, 2009). Private tutors 
and schools are fl ourishing under these demands. 
However, private schools and education in China are diverse; the Gui Zu 
Xue Xiao, or noble schools, provide sophisticated instructional equipment and 
luxurious accommodations serving only the elites, whereas the Min Ban Xue 
Xiao, or the people-run schools, operate from makeshift facilities catering to the 
masses, especially the unplanned children who were born out of the family plan-
ning policy (Kwong, 1997). As mentioned above, couples who have unplanned 
births are subject to severe penalties, including the high “social compensation 
fee [SCF],” job loss or demotion (Yang, 2007). Government policy also punishes 
unplanned children by denying them essential rights and social support. Ineligible 
for Hu Kou or the household registration 4, the unplanned children have no right 
to schooling, health care, state-sector employment, and a host of other state ser-
vices and benefi ts (Fan & Huang, 1989). Parents still demand a basic education 
for their unplanned children. Under this social context, the Min Ban, or people-
run schools, are set up in response to the inability of the current educational sys-
tem to adapt to the rapid social reconfi gurations and changes in society. These 
schools have played a supplementary and self-help function within the present 
educational system (Han, 2004).  The emergence and expansion of Min Ban or 
people-run schools have basically fi lled the gap in compulsory education for un-
planned children.
Moreover, the internal migration has also contributed to the emergence of 
the people-run schools. Since the economic reforms initiated in the late 1970s, 
China has undergone rapid modernization, industrialization, and urbanization. As 
urbanization expanded, so did the discrepancy between urban and rural incomes 
and living standards (China Labour Bulletin [CLB], 2009). As a result of such 
discrepancy, millions of farmers have left their homes and migrated to the cities 
in search of work and a better life. Large-scale internal migration has thus be-
come one of the most prominent by-products of the socioeconomic development 
of China. According to the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) of China (2009), 
there are 225.42 million migrant workers in China—more than the populations 
of the United Kingdom, France, and Australia combined (Hamey, 2008). An es-
timated 19 million children have accompanied their migrant parents to the cities 
(Chan, 2009). Because urban governments are only responsible for the education 
of children with an urban hu kuo, they have no obligations to educate migrant 
children. As the governments of the host cities do not have a responsibility to pro-
vide social welfare and services to migrants and their children, migrant children’s 
basic rights to health care, education, and socialization are denied, leading to a 
higher rate of emotional, behavioral, and psychological problems (Chan, 2009). 
Ignored, migrant children have become the city’s “invisible population.”  As a 
collective response to such educational inequity, migrant communities are try-
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ing to rebuild social networks and renew the sense of hope among the children 
through people-run migrant schools.  People-run schools are thus an alternative 
for migrant children’s education.
Nonetheless, many of the Min Ban, or people-run schools, are plagued by high 
turnover of students, high rate of teacher turnover, less qualifi ed teachers, poor 
school conditions, and substandard curriculum. Furthermore, Min Ban schools, 
face the problem of recruiting and retaining qualifi ed teachers. The teacher turn-
over rate is high due to low wages and heavy teaching loads. For example, accord-
ing to a survey of 59 Min Ban schools in Shanghai, Ding (2004) reports that about 
78.3 percent of the teachers earned a monthly income of RMB 700 yuan or less, 
and, of these, 13.7 percent earned between RMB 300 yuan and RMB 500 yuan. 
The average monthly income for local offi ce workers, however, was RMB 2,815 
yuan (US$339) 5 in 2004. Moreover, the operating conditions in Min Ban schools 
vary greatly, because these schools are set up with private funds and rely mainly 
on student tuition as revenue. Some more effective schools lease empty public 
school buildings, whereas others have classes in civilian homes, dilapidated ware-
houses, or primitive jerrybuilt houses (Ding, 2004; Han, 2004). Classrooms are 
overcrowded with as many as ninety-three students (Ding). Lighting, heating, and 
ventilation are poor; some lack fi re exits, drinking water, sanitary facilities, health 
clinics, and playgrounds. The inequity of unplanned children’s education is fur-
ther exacerbated by the substandard curriculum in Min Ban schools. Due to lack 
of funding, qualifi ed teachers and facilities, many Min Ban schools can only offer 
basic Chinese language and math classes. In contrast, the urban students in public 
schools or in elite private schools have the opportunity to learn English, computer 
skills, music, arts, social studies, science, and so forth (Han, 2004).
The emergence and growing importance of private education in China have 
indeed evolved from China’s unique transitional social and economic context. Gui 
Zu or noble private schools are catering to China’s nouveau riche’s demand for 
the best education for their only children, who are often referred to as “the little 
emperors.”  Moreover, these parents regard the elite private schools as a symbol 
of high social status (Arora, 2010). On the other hand, for parents of  unplanned 
children and for many migrant parents, Min Ban, or people-run private schools, 
are “merely temporary venues for education, providing their children with a basic 
knowledge of mathematics, reading and writing” (Han. 2004, p. 44). Nonethe-
less, with the increasing number of self-fi nancing students and non-government 
education providers (including elite private schools and people-run schools), Chi-
na’s education has been undergoing diversifi cation, marketization, privatization, 
commodifi cation and decentralization (Borevskaya, 2003; Mok,et al., 2009). The 
one-child policy has led to inequities in schooling experiences for planned and 
unplanned children in China. 
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CONCLUSION
It is evident that one of the foremost objectives of China’s one-child policy 
is to control population growth in order to ensure quality of life. As noted at the 
Cairo Conference on Population in 1994, “any effort to slow population growth 
necessarily involved reducing poverty, seeking economic progress, improving the 
status of women, environmental protection, and reducing unsustainable consump-
tion and production” (United Nations General Assembly, 1994, p.2). The profound 
impacts of the one-child policy on family structure, women’s rights and roles, and 
socialization process have been wildly acknowledged (Goodstadt, 1982; Chow & 
Chen, 1989; Greenhalgh, 2003; Yang, 2007). Less well known, however, is the 
nature and extent of this policy’s effect on the privatization of education in China. 
Therefore, this article reviews literature, media reports, and laws in order to docu-
ment the direct and indirect impact of the one-child policy on China’s education 
system. It further investigates the relationship between the policy and the emer-
gence of two types of private schools (Gui Zu Xue Xiao and Min Ban Xue Xiao). I 
argue that parents of only children put all their hopes on the single child and have 
higher expectations for him or her. Parents devote more fi nancial resources, time, 
attention, and energy to the only children, which may contribute to their cognitive 
advancement and increase the ability of the children to compete academically. 
Gui Zu Xue Xiao have emerged to cater to these parents’ needs and demands. 
For many parents of unplanned children or migrant parents, Min Ban Xue Xiao 
are the alternative venue that their children can receive a basic education, since 
unplanned children are deprived of basic rights and social services. 
Educational stratifi cation and inequality is evident between the Gui Zu Xue 
Xiao and the Min Ban Xue Xiao, which refl ects the increasing gap between the 
rich and the poor, and intensifi ed social inequality between the haves and the 
have-nots. What will the Chinese government do to alleviate the growing tensions 
between different social groups, for example, the elite and the poor, the planned 
and unplanned people? Will China move towards attracting capital fl ows to cities 
and the amelioration of the unequal distribution of knowledge, power, language 
and material resources to growing populations? Will China develop into a society 
of fundamental social divisions between the poor and the rich with the emergence 
of binary provision in education? Will the education system continue to deny 
basic education rights to the unplanned children? What is the future of private 
schools (both the Gui Zu Xue Xiao and the Min Ban Xue Xiao) like? These are the 
questions that future research should address. Policy makers should also focus on 
new approaches to family planning and ways of improving educational and social 
equality for unplanned children. If the Chinese government fails to properly bal-
ance the tensions between economic effi ciency and social inequality, these social 
problems could escalate and cause signifi cant political pressures and turmoil.   




1. The “Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution” (1966-76) was launched by Chinese Communist 
Party (CCP) chairman Mao Zedong to stem what he perceived as the country’s drift away from social-
ism and toward the “restoration of capitalism.” The Cultural Revolution is now referred to in China as 
the “decade of chaos” and is generally regarded as one of the bleakest periods in the country’s modern 
history. The movement’s ideals were betrayed at every turn by its destructive impulses. The much–
vaunted initiatives that were to transform the nation often had disastrous consequences for China’s 
education and cultural life. Economic development was disrupted by factional strife and misguided 
“ultraleftist” policies (Joseph, 2001).
2. Normal circumstances are broadly defi ned as that the couple is not ethnic minorities, is not 
from overseas, has siblings, has a healthy child. If, for example, the fi rst child has health problems 
(broadly defi ned), the couple is allowed to have a second birth (Yang, 2007). 
3. Currently, the amount of SCF to be paid for an out-of-plan birth is from 2 to 3 times the 
amount of the local per capita annual income (Yang, 2007, p. 473).
4. The government instituted a permanent and rigorous system of household registration or hu 
kou in 1955 to control migration (Han, 2004). A rural household (nong cun hu kou) or an urban house-
hold (cheng shi hu kou) was assigned to a Chinese citizen based on his or her mother’s residence. 
Local governments were responsible for providing the residents whose hu kou was registered in its ju-
risdiction with welfare and social services, including education, housing, and health care (CLB, 2009). 
Residents were not allowed to work or live outside the administrative boundaries of their household 
registration (hu kou) without permission of the authorities. 
5. The current exchange rate is one US dollar equals 6.5 Ren Min Bi [RMB] yuan. 
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